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Abstract
In this paper we address the cooperation problem in structured populations by considering the
prisoner’s dilemma game as metaphor of the social interactions between individuals with imitation
capacity. We present a new strategy update rule called democratic weighted update where the
individuals behavior is socially influenced by each one of their neighbors. In particular, the capacity
of an individual to socially influence other ones is proportional to its wisdom which is defined by
its successful in the game. When in a neighborhood there are cooperators and defectors, the focal
player is contradictorily influenced by them and, therefore, the effective social influence is given
by the difference of the total wisdom of each strategy in its neighborhood. First, by considering
the growing process of the network and neglecting mutations we show the evolution of highly
cooperative systems. Then, we broadly shown that the social influence allows to overcome the
emergence of mutants into highly cooperative systems. In this way, we are able to conclude
that considering the growing process of the system, individuals with imitation capacity and the
social influence the cooperation evolves. Therefore, here we present a theoretical solution of the
cooperation problem among unrelated individuals with imitiation capacity.
Keywords: Cooperation; Evolutionary Game Theory; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Networks; Growing
Systems, Social influence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is ubiquitous in every form of life [1–4], ranging from genes to societies such
as the human one. The emergence of cooperation is an evolutionary transition that increases
the complexity of life by forming new biological organisms from other ones. It is interesting
to note that some biological individuals such as the human beings and the ants have a
dual nature, they are part of a more complex organism at the same time that an organism
more complex than its parts. This self-similar feature shows that cooperation is a fractal
property of life. Besides, it is important to note that the cooperation among organisms is
temporary since every form of life dies. In this sense, the cooperative organisms must to
develop reproductive capacity in order to evolve beyond its life. Therefore, understanding the
mechanisms that allow the formation, persistence and reproduction of cooperative systems
is essential. The evolution of cooperation has been widely considered [5–10] in literature.
In this long and successful tradition, lot of attention has been paid to better understand
the evolution of our society. Although several proposed models [11] allow explaining the
cooperation of many actual situations, we still cannot solve the problem in a general way.
Therefore, we have to keep looking for answers to develop a theoretical model of our society.
Evolutionary game theory [12, 13] has proven to be an appropriate theoretical framework
to formally address the cooperation problem. In this theory, the most important prototypical
social interactions [14] are represented by a game where each individual adopts a strategy to
play against its opponent. In order to consider Darwinian theory, the system evolves favoring
the replication of the successful strategies. In particular, the Prisoner’s Dilemma has been
the most widely studied game as metaphor of the cooperation problem. In this, each player
adopts one of the two possible strategies, cooperation or defection. When in an interaction
both individuals cooperate each receive a payoff R and other one P under mutual defection.
If one cooperates and the other defects, the former receives S and the second T . The game
is completely defined when T > R > P > S. Under these conditions and in a one-shot
game, it is better to defect no matter the strategy adopted by the opponents. Thus, in
fully connected systems defection always has the highest reproduction rate. Therefore, the
system evolves decreasing the fraction of cooperators to extinction. However, individuals of
actual cooperative systems have local information of the system instead global one. They
are placed in a structured population interacting with just some other ones. Taking this
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into account, several studies have been performed [15–29] considering different properties
of actual networks interactions. In this way, it has been shown that some features such
as locality [17] and degree heterogeneity [19–21] could be [26–28] of great importance for
the evolution of cooperation. However, given the high benefit-cost ratio (see next section)
required for cooperation to evolve respect to the one observed in nature, which is particularly
evident when the system has a high average number of connections [29], the problem is not
completely solved just considering the structure of actual systems. In order to overcome
this limitation, some features such as individuals who can distinguish their opponents [30],
rewiring process introduced through coevolutionary dynamics [31] and multiplex networks
[32] have been considered showing great importance for the evolution of cooperation.
Recently, it has proposed [34, 35] a new formulation of the cooperation problem taking
into account two general features of actual cooperative systems, i.e. the growing process
and the possibility of mutations. By considering individuals with imitation capacity and
neglecting mutations, they have shown under very low conditions mechanisms to build highly
cooperative systems of any size and topology. In particular, the minimal benefit-cost ratio
r required for cooperation to evolve approaches to the theoretical minimum r = 1 when the
average number of links of the system increases. Remarkably, the growing process generates
locality and degree heterogeneity that, as we previously stated, seem to be important features
for the evolution of cooperation. However, from this process other features of actual systems
emerge drastically improving the required conditions for cooperation to evolve. On the
one hand, the system have a high level of cooperation in all stages instead half or less
of the population normally considered as initial condition in already formed systems [15,
16]. On the other hand, defectors inhabit the less linked parts of the system which is the
optimal arrangement for the cooperation [36]. In this way, they have shown that the growing
process is essential for the evolution of cooperation when the individuals have imitation
capacity as the human being. Nevertheless, the emerging cooperative systems require a very
high benefit-cost ratio [36] to overcome the emergence of mutant defectors in highly linked
individuals of the system. In this way, the new organism is alive just until highly connected
mutants defectors appear into the system. In this sense, the longevity and the system
size strongly dependent of the mutation rate of individuals. However, there are organisms
such as the human society whose size and longevity cannot be explained completely by the
3
model. Therefore, in order to show theoretically the very existence of this kind of systems,
it is required to introduce new features to the model allowing to the system overcomes
the apparition of mutants defectors. In this paper, we address this problem performing
considerations over the strategy update rule by which individuals adopt their strategy.
Through the evolution of the system, the individuals adopt a strategy by evaluating the
information provided by the environment or by mutation. When the problem is considered
over structured populations, each individual have information from its neighborhood, i.e.
itself and its neighbors. Normally, players are considered without memory or prediction
capacity. Therefore, the information of each individual is restricted to payoffs and strategies
from the last round of its neighborhood. Generally, the strategy updates of each individual
are performed by comparison of the payoff of the focal player with the one of a neighbor, who
can be the most successful or a randomly selected one. In this way, the individuals with more
than one link choose their strategy neglecting part of the information available. However,
a strategy update where the whole neighborhood affects simultaneously the behavior of the
focal player seems to be more realistic. Taking this as motivation, a new strategy update
rule [37] has been recently proposed where the focal player evaluates its strategy by com-
paring the average payoff of each strategy in the neighborhood. Studying the new rule over
already formed regular lattices, they have shown a significant increment in the survivability
of cooperators with respect to the one obtained by a pairwise comparison rule. Although the
average payoff of each strategy allows taking into account all the payoffs simultaneously, this
strategy update rule is still neglecting part of the information available since the abundance
of each strategy in the neighborhood is not taken into account. However, the last is very im-
portant in order to exploit properly the information available from individuals. Fortunately,
this has been recently taken into account [38] through the learning activity of players by
considering that it increases with the number of neighbors with different strategy. In par-
ticular, they have defined the wisdom of each strategy in a neighborhood as its abundance.
In this way, they have shown that the neighborhood wisdom enhances the survivability of
cooperation over already formed regular lattices. This occurs by a dynamically decelerated
invasion process, by means of which interfaces separating different domains remain smooth
and defectors therefore become unable to efficiently invade cooperators.
Here, we present a new strategy update rule, that we call democratic weighted update,
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where the average payoff and the abundance of each strategy in the neighborhood of the
focal players is taken into account simultaneously. It is important to state that we define
the wisdom of individuals in a very different way than in [38]. We consider the wisdom
of each individual as a combination of its strategy and payoff instead just its strategy. In
particular, we define the wisdom of each individual as proportional to its payoff. In this way,
individuals with high payoff are wiser than those with low one. Thus, the wisdom of the
system is heterogeneously distributed among individuals instead of being homogeneous. We
justify this consideration by the following. First, from the perspective of a focal player, the
neighbors with high payoff seems to be better players than those with low ones and, therefore,
they are more reliable. In this sense, the payoff of each individual can be interpreted as
a measure of its reputation regardless of its strategy. Second, from the statistical point
of view, when the connectivity of the system is heterogeneous the payoff of an individual
normally increases with its degree. Thus, individuals with high payoff have, in average, more
information of the system than individuals with low one and, therefore, their information is
more reliable. Otherwise, we consider that the behavior of individuals is socially influenced
by the wisdom of every individuals of their neighborhood. When the total wisdom of the
neighborhood is divided by the existence of both strategies, the focal player is influenced by
these contradictory knowledge to opposite directions. Hence, the effective social influence
over the focal player is defined by the difference between the total wisdom of each strategy
instead by the absolute one considered through the learning activity. Through the work
we broadly shown that the social influence allows to structured highly cooperative systems
overcome the emergence of mutant defectors. In this way and considering [34, 35], we
conclude that in structured growing system whose individuals have imitation capacity and
their behavior is affected by social influence cooperation evolves. Therefore, here we present
a theoretical solution of the cooperation problem among unrelated individuals with imitation
capacity.
II. THE MODEL
Each individual is represented by a node of a network, whose links determine the interact-
ing individuals. We considered all nodes intrinsically equal and all connections undirected
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and with equal weight. Each interaction between individuals is modeled by a round of the
prisoner’s dilemma game. We choose T = b, R = b − c, P = 0 and S = −c that allow it
to reduce the analisys to a single parameter defined by the benefit-cost ratio r = b/c. After
one round of the game for each link, the payoff Pi of individual i is defined as follows. If
i is a cooperator obtains a payoff Pi = k
c
i b − kic, where ki is the degree of i and kci the
number of cooperative neighbors. When i is a defector linked to kci cooperators it gets a
Payoff Pi = k
c
i b. For a sake of simplicity, we consider individuals without memory or pre-
diction capacity and all strategies of the system are updated simultaneously (synchronous
update) following the weighted democratic update explained in the next section. A complete
update of the system is called a generation. Besides, it is important to state that the con-
clusions reached through the work are not affected if the strategy update is performed in
an asynchronous way. However, it would be of great interest perform a thorough analysis
considering this general feature of actual systems.
We assume that the system growth exponentially by the incorporation of new individuals.
These are considered defectors in order to simulate the worst conditions that the cooperative
system must to resist. Unless otherwise stated, we do not take into account the genetic
relatedness between players and, therefore, the origin of the new nodes is not important for
conclusions. Besides, for simplicity, we do not take into account the elimination of nodes
but, however, this can be considered without modify conclusions. Between two generations,
we leave growth the system a time ∆t. Considering that the system has performed an
strategy updates in time t0, the next generation is performed when the system reaches a
size N(t0 + ∆t) = N(t0)e
a∆t = N(t0)(1 + n), where a is the rate to which new individuals
are introduced to the system. In this way, between two generation the system grows a
fraction n. It is remarkable that any other growth more slowly than exponential do not
modify the conclusion reached. In this situation, it is expected a lower value of n than
the one required for exponential growth and, as we will show, it is covered by the results.
Otherwise, we consider that individuals are allowed to change their strategy in two different
ways, by imitation following the democratic weighted update or by mutation which do not
require environmental motivation. In order to take the last into account, we define Pm as
the probability of an individual mutates between two generations.
Here, we explore the model under three different mechanisms of network growth to per-
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form an exhaustive study of the model. First, we consider the Baraba´si-Albert model (BAM)
[39]. In this, the system growth from N0 fully connected nodes by the incorporation of new
individuals with L links, we consider N0 = L. Each new link is attached to an already ex-
isting node of the system by preferential attachment, i.e. with a probability proportional to
the degree of the existing nodes. This model generates networks with a degree distribution
governed by a power law P (k) ∼ k−γ with an exponent γ ' 2, 9 in the thermodynamic limit
N → ∞. Second, we explore the model by considering the Model A (MA) [35]. Starting
from a fully linked networks of N0 = L, the system grows by the incorporation of new indi-
viduals. For each new node, the system introduces L new links. One of them connects the
new node with an existing one chosen by preferential attachment. The remaining L−1 links
are placed between a random chosen node and other one selected by preferential attach-
ment. This procedure also generates scale-free networks where individuals with less than
L links are allowed in opposition with BAM. Third, we employ a random network model
(RNM). As the previous ones, the system growth from N0 = L fully linked individuals by
the incorporation of new ones. Then, the system introduces L new links for each new node
in the following way. The new node is linked to a random picked node and the remaining
L− 1 links are placed between any two nodes randomly chosen. This mechanism produces
networks with an exponential degree distributions where individuals with less than L links
are allowed. It is important to state that in the three network generation models, we avoid
the formation of double connections. We choose these models for two reasons. On the one
hand, comparing the results of BAM and MA we can determine the importance of the ex-
istence of nodes with less than L links, which has shown [35] to be very important in the
formation of cooperative systems without mutations. Besides, we can study the importance
of the degree heterogeneity by comparing the results obtained with MA and RNM.
III. DEMOCRATIC WEIGHTED UPDATE
As we stated in the introduction, we consider that the behavior of any focal player i is
affected by all the members of its neighborhood I through the information provided by them,
i.e. payoff and strategy of each individual in the neighborhood. Here, individuals evaluate
their strategy considering this information as follows. First, for a sake of simplicity, we
divide the neighborhood in two sets namely O and S, where O are the players with different
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strategy than i and S the remaining ones. Then, we say that the focal player is motivated
to change its strategy if two conditions are satisfied. On the one hand, the set O must not
be empty. On the other hand, the average payoff P¯O =
∑
l∈O Pl/
∑
l∈O 1 of the set O must
to be higher than the average payoff P¯S =
∑
l∈S Pl/
∑
l∈S 1 of the set S, i.e. P¯O > P¯S.
When these conditions are satisfied the focal player notes that there is a different strategy
than its own that, in average, it is doing better. When O and S have a similar number of
elements, the average payoffs difference P¯O − P¯S could be a good measure of which strategy
is better. Nevertheless, in the situation where O (S) have much more elements that S (O),
the average payoff of P¯O (P¯S) is statistically more reliable than the other one. In this sense,
the abundance of each strategy becomes important information that must be considered.
Here, we take this into account by considering that the social influence of each individual
over its neighbors is defined by its payoff. In this way, individuals with high payoff have a
stronger influence over the behavior of its neighbors than players with low one. Thereby, the
total social influence of each strategy over a focal player is defined by the accumulated payoff
PO =
∑
l∈O Pl for the strategy O and PS =
∑
l∈S Pl for the strategy S. Thus, the effective
social influence over the focal player is defined by PO − PS. In this way, when PO > PS
(PO < PS) the social influence favors the strategy of the set O (S) and when PO = PS
the social pressure does not have effect over i. Thus, we consider that a motivated player
changes its strategy with a probability w that increases with the effective social influence
PO − PS. We perform this by introducing the Fermi function (ref) as follow:
w =
1
1 + e−β(PO−PS)
, (1)
where β is the intensity of social influence over the focal player. When β → 0 the
abundance of each strategy becomes neutral and the individual i changes its strategy with
a probability w → 1/2. Otherwise, when β →∞ the focal player changes its strategy with
w → 1 (w → 0) when PO > PS (PO < PS) and, therefore, the influence of the neighborhood
becomes determinant in the behavior of i. It is interesting to note that if β = 0 or PO = PS
the motivated focal player preserves or changes its strategy with equal probability since
w = 1/2. This situation can be interpreted as the individual i trusts in its last choice as
much as in the best average strategy of its neighborhood in the last round. Therefore, the
focal player valuates more its own information than the provided by a neighbor. Otherwise,
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when β → ∞ and PO 6= PS, the focal player considers equally important the information
provided for each member of its neighborhood. Lastly, for intermediate values of β and
PO 6= PS, the focal player i considers its information more important than the provided by
a neighbor at the same time that the social influence is considered.
Besides, since w 6= 0 for all β and PO −PS, any motivated player is allowed to change its
strategy even when PO < PS. This is important because allow to individuals overcome the
social influence taking a strategy in opposition to the wisdom or pressure of the group. Here,
the motivation of a focal player to change its strategy has been defined in a deterministic way.
However, the strategy update can be generalized by considering a motivation probability m
of change strategy that increases with P¯O − P¯S. In particular, this can be newly performed
through the Fermi function defined by m = 1/(1 + e−α(P¯O−P¯S)), where α is the intensity
of natural selection. In this way, when in a neighborhood there are two strategies, the
probability that the focal player changes its strategy is defined by PS→O = m × w, where
the previous situation is recovered for α→∞. It is interesting to note that when β = 0, the
democratic weighted update is reduced to the strategy update proposed in [37]. However,
although it would be interesting to explore thoroughly the influence of α in the results of
the model, we just consider the case where α → ∞. However, we have checked that the
conclusions reached through the work are unaltered considering any α > 0.01. Therefore,
the conclusions are robust to this consideration.
IV. THE FORMATION OF HIGHLY COOPERATIVE SYSTEMS WITHOUT
MUTATIONS
To perform a clear analysis of the model, we start exploring it for Pm = 0. To this, we
look for the critical rc required to maintain a stable and high level of cooperation when
the system grows from an initial structure of Ni cooperators by the incorporation of new
defectors. Through the paper we consider Ni = 1000 in order to ensure a proper develop-
ment of the topological structure of the network under consideration. Nevertheless, we can
justify this initial cooperative structure by extending the results of [35], where it has been
introduced considerations that allow the formation of this initial structure of cooperators.
In fig. 1 we show the fraction of cooperators c¯ as a function of the benefit-cost ratio r for
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the three growing mechanisms explored and different values of the parameters L, β and n.
These results have been obtained averaging 100 different realizations of the model, which
correspond to simulations where the system has grown to N = 104. The fraction of cooper-
ators c¯ of each realization has been obtained averaging the level of cooperation reached by
the system after each generation for N > 9× 103.
In fig. 1(a) we can see the results obtained by the three growing mechanisms explored,
i.e. BAM, MA and RNM. In all cases we observe a phase transition from a non-cooperative
state to a highly cooperative one with some critical benefit-cost ratio rc. In particular, it is
remarkable the very low rc required for cooperation to evolve irrespective of the underlying
network formation mechanism. Also, as it is expected [19–21], we observe by comparing
the results of RNM and MA that rc decreases when the degree heterogeneity increases.
Nevertheless, the benefit for the evolution of cooperation produced by increasing the degree
heterogeneity of the system is much less significant than the one of already formed systems
[15, 16]. Otherwise, we shown again [35] that MA requires a lower value of rc than BAM
for cooperation to evolve. Besides, it is very interesting to note that RNM presents a rc
lower than the one of BAM even when RNM is much less heterogeneous than BAM. This
remarkable result without precedent in the literature shows newly [35] the great importance
of avoid the introduction of new individuals with many connection performed simultaneously.
When the systems is highly cooperative, the capacity of a defector to exploit the system
is approximately proportional to its degree k. Therefore, when the new individuals are
introduced to the system with many connections (L) simultaneously instead one at a time,
the system requires a higher rc to overcome the incorporation of these strong new defectors
and, therefore, the required rc for cooperation to evolve increases.
In fig. 1(b) we explore the influence of the average degree k¯ ' 2L in the required rc
for cooperation to evolve. As well as in [35], the critical rc decreases approaching to the
theoretical minimum rc = 1 when k¯ increases. When the systems is highly cooperative
the payoff of individuals is approximately proportional to its degree. Besides, considering
that cooperators inhabit the most linked parts of the system and defectors the lowest ones
[34, 35], the average payoff difference between defectors and cooperators increases with k¯
and, therefore, rc decreases with k¯. Nevertheless, it is important to note that for any L the
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Figure 1: The model without mutations. The fraction of cooperators as a function of the benefit-
cost ratio for different network growth and parameters of the model. (a) The model over different
growing mechanisms. (b) The influence of the average degree k¯ ' 2L. (c) The dependence with the
intensity of social pressure β. (d) Exploring the model over different values of n. The parameters
not specified in each figure correspond to L = 4, β = 1.0, n = 0.001 and using MA as growing
mechanism.
system presents a very low rc. Besides, we observe the existence of other transitions that
increases slightly the fraction of cooperator into the system. In particular, these transitions
are clear in r = 2 and r = 3 for L = 2, and also in r = 2 for L = 3. As it has been shown
[35], when a defector is connected only with a cooperator who in turn is connected with
k other cooperators, for r > (k + 1)/(k − 1) the cooperator have a higher payoff than the
defector and, therefore, the cooperator is favored by natural selection. In particular, the
cases k = 2 and k = 3 correspond to the transitions r = 3 and r = 2 respectively. When
the average degree of the system increases, the probability of a defector to be connected
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with a cooperator with few connection decreases and, therefore, these transitions become
less evident.
In fig. 1(c) we can see how the model behave for different values of the intensity of social
influence β. In particular, it shown that according as β increases the critical rc decreases.
In this way, we show that the social influence have a positive effect for the evolution of
cooperation when Pm = 0. However, the cooperation evolves with a very low rc irrespective
of β. Besides, it is interesting to note that rc goes to the one showed in [35] when β → 0.
This is important because shows that previous conclusions are robust when it is considered
the average payoff of each strategy instead a pairwise comparison. Also, since β does not
modify drastically rc we conclude that the social influence is important but not determinant
in the formation of cooperative systems without mutations. Otherwise, in fig. 1(d) we show
results of the model for different values of n. As we can see, rc is independent of n ≤ 0.05.
The only consequence of n is a diminution in c¯ when n increases. This is expected since n
determines the number of new defectors between two generations. Finally, it is important
to state, that the initial structure of Ni cooperators can be justified by extending the results
of [35] since here we largely shown that the required rc is always improved by the social
influence. In this way, we have justified the formation of highly cooperative systems of any
size when Pm = 0.
At this point, we could be interested in the consequences of the social influence in al-
ready formed structured populations. Here, for space reasons, we limit to comment that
the rc required for cooperation to evolve is deeply worsened, in particular when L increases.
Therefore, we are newly showing the great importance of the growing process for the evolu-
tion of cooperation in systems whose individuals have imitation capacity and the mutation
probability is low enough to be neglected. Under these conditions, the cooperators inhabit
the most linked parts of the system and defectors the lowest ones. Since this arrangement of
cooperators and defectors into the system is the optimal for cooperation, the required r for
cooperation to evolve is drastically reduced with respect to one of already formed systems.
In particular, we have broadly shown that the system requires a very low rc independently
of the parameters of the model shown, the growing mechanisms and the strategy update
considered. Besides, we have checked that equivalent conclusion can be reached for any
traditional game, i.e. the snow-drift game, the stag-hunt game and public good games.
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Therefore, given the great robustness of conclusions, we propose the growing process as an
universal mechanism for the evolution of cooperation when Pm = 0 and the individuals of
the system imitators.
V. THE HIGHLY COOPERATIVE SYSTEM OVERCOMING MUTANTS
In the last section, we have shown that the required rc for cooperation to evolve when
Pm = 0 is very low independently of the remaining parameters of the model and the growing
mechanism considered. However, in order to show that the model is a complete solution of
the cooperation problem formulated in [34], it is required that cooperation prevails into the
system even when Pm 6= 0. Since the impact of mutant defectors over the system is very
sensitive to the area of the network where they appear, it is very important to explore the
emergence of mutants considering a lot of generations to cover a great number of possible
configurations of defectors into the system. To this, we address the problem considering the
apparition of mutants between generations but not the incorporation of new defectors. In
this way, we study the evolution of the system when mutants appear in a system with fixed
size N and considering a fully cooperative system as initial condition. We choose this way to
explore the model because it allows to consider efficiently many generations since otherwise
the system size N required to reach the same number of generations becomes very large, and
therefore, computationally inefficient. Besides, this procedure helps to focus the attention
just over the mutants since they are the only source of defectors. However, it is important
to state, as we will show (see fig. 3), that almost equivalent results are obtained when
both processes are considered simultaneously for Ni ≥ 1000. Then, we will extend results to
systems smaller than N = 1000 in order to show that the model allows cooperation to evolve
under very low conditions for any N . The results obtained considering a fixed system size
have been obtained averaging 100 different realizations of the model, where fully cooperative
systems of N = 104 individuals as initial condition have been considered. The fraction of
cooperators of each realization has been obtained averaging the level of cooperation over 103
generations after a transient of 104 generations.
In fig. 2 we show the fraction of cooperators into the system as a function of the benefit-
13
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Figure 2: The emergence of mutants in highly cooperative systems. The fraction of cooperators
as a function of the benefit-cost ratio for different network growth and parameters of the model.
(a) The model for different values of the mutation probability Pm. (b) The dependence with the
intensity of social influence β. (C) The effect of the average degree k¯ ' 2L. (c) The model over
different growing mechanisms. The parameters not specified in each figure correspond to L = 4,
β = 1.0, Pm = 0.01 and using MA as growing mechanism.
cost ratio r for the three growing mechanisms considered and many values of the parameters
of the model L, β, n and Pm. In particular, fig. 2 (a) shows results of the model for different
values of Pm. As we can see, the system presents a phase transition from a non-cooperative
to a cooperative one for some rc. In particular, we observe an increment of rc with Pm.
However, it is remarkable that the system present a low rc even for the very high mutation
rate Pm = 0.05. In this way, we shown that the social influence allows to overcome the
apparition of mutant defectors in highly cooperative systems. It is important to state, that
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for some Pm > 0.05, as it is expected, the system cannot reach a high and stable value of
cooperation regardless of the value of r given the great noise in the behavior of individuals.
Otherwise, in fig. 2 (b) we show results of the model for different values of the social influence
intensity β. We observe that rc is not strongly dependent for β > 0.01 but it increases fast
for β < 0.01. In particular, we have checked that for β = 0 is not possible to reach a stable
value of cooperation for any r. Nevertheless, the cooperation evolves with a very low rc
for all β considered. Therefore, the social influence is a very strong mechanism to preserve
cooperation in highly cooperative systems despite the emergence of mutant defectors.
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Figure 3: The equivalence between growing systems and already formed highly cooperative ones.
In both cases we employ MA for the network formation, Pm = 0.01, L = 4 and β = 1. For the
growing results we choose n = 0.001 and a final system size N = 104. Otherwise, the results of the
static case have been obtained for N = 104.
In fig. 2 (c) we show the behavior of c¯(r) for different values of L. Surprisingly, the
model presents an optimal k¯ where rc is minimal. This is a very interesting result that
could help to understand why actual networks [33] has evolved to the everage k¯ observed.
In particular, it would be of great interest to develop a network generation model where
the average degree of the system is determined by coevolutionary dynamics [31] instead of
being exogenously introduced. Nevertheless, it is very important to note that the system
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presents a low rc for all the k¯ considered and, therefore, we are able to conclude that the
model is very robust to k¯. Moreover, in fig. 2 (d) we show results for the three growing
mechanisms considered. We observed that cooperation requires a very low rc to evolve
irrespective of the underlying growing mechanism and, therefore, the model is very robust
to this consideration. Besides, it is remarkable that MA and even RNM reduce rc with
respect to the one required with BAM. In this way, we are showing that the existence
of individuals with less than L links is also very important to overcome the emergence of
mutant defectors. This feature is generally neglected in agent-based models but it could have
also important implications. Thus, we hope with this result motivates further researches
considering MA as the skeleton of the system. Otherwise, we observe, for the RNM results,
a smoother phase transition than the one obtained with MA. In particular, the region where
c¯ reaches intermediate values correspond to the situation where some realizations finish with
a high level of cooperation and other ones near zero cooperation. This very important result
shows that the life expectancy of the cooperative system increases with r. In this way,
by considering an greater number of generations is expected smoother transitions for any
growing mechanism considered. Besides, by comparing the RNM and MA results, we observe
a higher life expectancy as well as a lower rc when the degree heterogeneity of the system
increases. Anyway, we have considered a great number of generations and realizations for
results and, therefore, the model generates cooperative systems with a great life expentancy.
Otherwise, for completeness and as it is expected, we have corroborated that cooperation is
extinguished after some generations in fully connected systems for any r considered. In this
way, the structure of the system is an essential feature for cooperation to evolve. However, it
is remarkable that even for the random growth mechanism cooperation is able to evolve for
a very low rc. Finally, in fig. 3 labeled as growing, we show results obtained considering the
growing process simultaneously with the apparition of mutants. Besides, labeled as static,
we show the results obtained with the same parameters values but without consider the
growing process. As we can see, both results are almost equivalents and, thus, we confirm
that the conclusions can be extended to the case where the growing process is considered
simultaneously with the emergence of mutants.
We have widely shown that the social influence allows to highly cooperative systems resist
the apparition of mutants for all the parameters considered whenever N ≥ 103. In order
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Figure 4: The cooperative seed. Cooperation fixation probability as a function of the number of
initial cooperators. The model parameters do not specified in the figure correspond to n = 0.01,
L = 4 and β = 1. We used MA for the network formation.
to extend these conclusions to systems with N < 103 we consider the cooperation fixation
probability Pf (Ni) defined as the probability that a system of Ni cooperators continues
being highly cooperative when it grows by the incorporation of defectors and considering
mutations. To obtain Pf we select a value r > rc and we perform M simulations starting
from a system of Ni cooperators. Then, we compute the number Mc of systems that reach
N = 104 with a fraction of cooperators c¯ > 1/2. Finally, we compute Pf for each Ni as
Mc/M , we consider M = 500. As it can be seen in fig. 4 for all curves, Pf grows steeply
and reaches the value 1 for some systems size. From this structure, called Cooperative Seed
(CS) [34], the cooperation is stable despite the system grows by incorporating defectors and
the emergence of mutants defectors. However, it is important to note that the instability
of the cooperation into the system is generated by the mutant defectors but not by the
new individuals given the results of the previous section. We observe that the minimal
system size required for cooperation to be stable is reduced when r increases. In this way, rc
decreases quickly with N when the system is small but, as soon as the degree distribution of
the system is well developed, rc becomes approximately size independent. It is interesting
to note that the existence of the cooperative seed is expected since the system starts to
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grow from a fully connected system, which cannot support mutant defectors. In this way,
the system need to develop payoff heterogeneities from degree ones in order to ensure the
stability of the cooperation. However, considering fig. 2 (d) and that rc 6= rc(N) from some
system size, we expect the existence of a optimal payoff heterogeneity where cooperation is
ensured for a low rc at the same time that these heterogeneities minimal. This is of great
interest for the search of a more egalitarian society. Nevertheless, for reasons of space, we
leave these explorations for further works. Otherwise, we observe that the size Nc of the CS
decreases with Pm for a fixed n. However, if Pm and n are not fixed, we have checked that
Nc increases with Pm/n. In this way, we have shown that combining the growing process,
social influence and individuals with imitation capacity, cooperation evolves under very low
conditions when N > Nc. In particular, when the system is small the cooperation becomes
unstable but with a high probability to overcome the critical system size Nc. Thus, it would
be of great interest to consider other features that allow reducing Nc. In particular, if the
new individuals come from the reproduction of already existing ones, it is expected high
genetic relatedness between linked individuals when the system is small. Then, it could be
considered a Pm that decreases with the genetic relatedness among individuals. In this way,
Pm would be low when the systems is small and the size of the CS reduced. This assumption
can be justified considering that mutations between genically related individuals supposed
that the survival probability of the offspring decreases [35]. Therefore, it is expected that
individuals with low mutation rate between related individuals evolve. Anyway, it would
be of great interest performs a thorough analysis looking for the optimal Pm = Pm(N) that
ensures the best performance of players.
Now, in order to better understand the underlying mechanism through which the social
influence allow overcoming the emergence of mutant defectors, in fig. 5 we show the fraction
of cooperation as a function of the generations of a single realization of the model. We ob-
serve that c¯ presents some irregular oscillations around the mean value c¯ ' 0, 96. These are
produced by the emergence of mutant defectors strong enough to spread their strategy into
the system by imitation. After the apparition of these mutants, the fraction of cooperation
decreases but, as we can see, the system is able to overcome these invasions by restoring the
level of cooperation. It is interesting to note that the defection invasions are of short range
since the system always preserves a high level of cooperation. However, it is important to
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Figure 5: The fraction of cooperation of a single realization as a function of the generations of the
system. The results have been obtained for L = 4, β = 1.0, r = 2.0 and using MA for the network
generation.
state that increasing L the defection invasions become deeper as it is expected considering
fig. 2 c. This could be particularly important to develop the previous suggested network
generation model where the average degree of the system is determined by coevolutionary
dynamics. Otherwise, the invasions are short lived because the cooperation level is restored
after few generations. In particular, we have checked that the range of the invasions depends
of the degree of the mutant defector as well as the number of mutant defectors that appear
into the systems between generations. In this sense, the deepest invasion observed is pro-
duced by several highly connected mutants instead by just one. Also, it is very important
to note that if many highly linked individuals mutate simultaneously the system can die
for any r > rc. Nevertheless, this occurs with very low probability Pd as we extensively
shown in fig. 2 given the great number of generations and realizations considered for the
results. Even so, the death of the organism is ensured since Pd 6= 0 and, as we stated in the
introduction, it is essential for the new organism acquires reproduction capacity in order to
avoid the extinction.
In fig. 6 we show the fraction of defectors in function of the degree of the nodes. These
19
0 5 1 0 1 5 2 00 , 0 0
0 , 1 5
0 , 3 0
0 , 4 5
0 , 6 0
  
 
Fra
ctio
n o
f de
fect
ors
D e g r e e
Figure 6: Fraction of defectors as a function of the degree of nodes. The results have been obtained
for L = 4, β = 1.0, r = 2.0, Pm = 0.01 and using MA for the network generation.
results have been obtained averaging over 9×103 generations after a transient of 103 one and
10 different networks. As we can see, the fraction of defectors decreases fast with the degree
of individuals approaching to 0, 01 which correspond to Pm. In this way, defectors inhabit
preferably the low linked individuals of the system and cooperators the highly connected
ones. Considering that the result have been obtained without consider the incorporation
of new individuals, we conclude that the invasions produced by the emergence of defectors
spread to the low linked individuals when the social influence is considered. In this way, it
is very important to the cooperative system the existence of individuals with low degree in
order to reduce the explotation capacity of defectors into the system. Therefore, this model
behavior explain why MA and RNM present a rc lower than BAM. Otherwise, in order
to understand the how the social influence allows to overcome the apparition of mutant
defectors producing this distribution of defectors into the system, we analyze the mechanism
by which a mutant defector newly becomes cooperator by social influence in a heterogeneous
highly cooperative system. In particular, in order to explore the worst situation possible,
we consider the case where a hub of a fully cooperative system mutates. When this occurs,
the mutant increases its payoff next round since all its neighbors are cooperators. However,
in the next generation its neighbors have a new possibility previously nonexistent, now they
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could change by imitating the strategy of the mutant. Since this is a hub, it is expected
P¯O > P¯S in the neighborhoods of its neighbors and, therefore, all of them are motivate
players. At this point it is important to note that the accumulated payoffs P jS and P
j
O of
a neighbor j of the mutant can be expressed as P jS = (kj − 1)P¯ jS and P jO = P¯ jO in the first
generation after the mutation respectively. In this way, it is expected P jO − P jS smaller in
average for high connected neighbors than for low linked ones. Therefore, the probability of
a neighbor to change its strategy next generation decreases in average with its degree. In
particular, considering β →∞ and r high enough, the low linked neighbors adopt defection
by imitation and the highly linked ones preserve cooperation as strategy. In this situation,
the mutant reduces its payoff next generation since now it have lot of new defector neighbors.
Besides, its average payoff P¯S is reduced since its defectors neighbors are poorly connected to
the systems and, therefore, with a low payoff. However, P¯O of the mutant increases because
all the neighbor cooperators are the highly linked ones. Thus, the mutant becomes in a
motivated player since in its neighborhood P¯O > P¯S if r if high enough. Therefore, in the
next generations the mutant becomes newly cooperator. In this way, after the emergence of
a mutant in a fully cooperative system, we have shown that defection spread preferably to
the low linked nodes.
In this way, through this section we have widely shown that a highly cooperative system
formed by a growing process is broadly able to overcome the emergence of mutants by
considering the social influence. Nevertheless, it is natural to ask about the outcome of the
model if the abundance of strategies is considered through the learning activity [38] instead
by social influence. Although it would be interesting a thorough analysis of this, we perform
a brief one in appendix A in order to newly show the great importance of take into account
the abundance of strategies as well as the advantages of the social influence.
A. Testing the model in human experiments
We believe of great interest to perform human experiments considering the growing pro-
cess of the system given that it has theoretically shown [34, 35] to generate a favorable
environment for cooperation to evolve irrespective of the underlying strategy update rule
and parameters of the model considered. To this kind of experience, the cooperative seed
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becomes particularly important due the great initial mutation rate reported in human ex-
periments [40]. Besides, it would be of great interest to test if the human being follows a
strategy updates similar to the democratic weighted update. In this sense, a very important
step towards the develop of a theoretical model of the human society is to understand how
the information provided by the neighborhood affects the behavior of the human beings.
Taking this as motivation, it has been performed several great human experiments [40–42]
where this problem has begun to be addressed. Although these experiments have shown sev-
eral important consequences, here we just highlight those that we consider more relevant. In
[40] has been shown that the human mutation rate is much higher than typically assumed
in theoretical models. In particular, it has been reported a very high initial mutation rate
which decays exponentially in time. Otherwise, in [41] have been shown that individuals do
not follow the well-known imitation to the best rule [17]. Lastly, in [42] has been shown that
degree heterogeneity do not promote cooperation when it is considered the payoff of indi-
viduals normalized by their degree. When these conclusions are taken into account, a great
number of theoretical predictions [15, 16], which are very susceptible to the strategy update
rule considered, are no longer valid to fully explain human cooperation. Nevertheless, it is
important to note that the experimental conditions considered in these works [40–42] are
very different to the everyday human reality and, therefore, the results obtained can still not
be conclusive. In particular, the experiments have been performed considering the payoff
of individuals normalized by their degree instead of considers the accumulated one. This
could have consequences as important as it does in theoretical models [28, 35] and, therefore,
it would be of great interest to consider this feature which clearly is present in the actual
human society.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND NEW PERSPECTIVES
In this paper we have addressed the cooperation problem over structured populations
considering the formulation performed in [34] and the prisoner’s dilemma game as metaphor
of the social interactions. We have introduced a new strategy update called democratic
weighted update considering that the individuals influence the behavior of their neighbors.
In particular, we have considered that the capacity of individuals to influence others is
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given by their wisdom which has been defined as proportional to their payoff. Besides,
when in a neighborhood there are cooperators and defectors, the focal player is influenced
contradictorily by the wisdom of individuals and, therefore, the effective social influence is
defined by the difference between the total wisdom of each strategy in the neighborhood.
We have extensively explored the model for a wide range of the parameters and several
growing mechanism showing, in any case, very low conditions for cooperation to evolve. In
this way we conclude that considering the growing process of the system, the social influence
and individuals with imitation capacity cooperation evolves and, therefore, we have shown a
complete theoretical solution of the cooperation problem among unrelated individuals with
imitation capacity. Besides, we have extended the conclusions to other ways to consider the
abundance of strategies in the neighborhood of individuals showing its great importance to
overcome the emergence of mutant defectors in highly cooperative systems. Thus, we hope
to have taken a step towards a theoretical model of the human society.
We believe that the model has very important implications in further theoretical re-
searches. In particular, the model allows assuming a highly cooperative system as initial
condition in agent-based models which has never been taken into account. Here, we have
considered that individuals are allowed to imitate cooperation or defection. However, it is
possible to consider other features of human being that spread into society by imitation such
as rumors, culture, opinions, thoughts, ideologies, etc. In this sense, it would be of great
interest understand how the success of individuals, mainly determined by the underlying
cooperative system, affect the propagation dynamics of this kind of information. In partic-
ular, it could be useful to understand how the knowledge of the human society increases in
time. To this, we believe a good first hypothesis to consider the existence of the truth and
that the new knowledge emerges from the mutation of an individual previous one. In this
way, the knowledge spreads by imitation favoring those which are closer to the truth.
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Appendix A: Introducing the abundance of strategies through the learning activity
As we stated in the introduction, the abundance of strategies in the neighborhood of the
focal players has been recently [38] introduced through the learning activity of individuals.
In particular, they have defined the learning activity Li of individual i as Li = (
∑
l∈O 1/ki)
a,
where a determines how seriously the abundance of strategies affects the behavior of individ-
uals and the degree ki of the focal player i ensures a proper normalization of the transition
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Figure 7: Considering the abundance of strategies through the learning activity of individuals.
Fraction of cooperators as a function of the benefit-cost ratio for different values of a. The results
have been obtained for L = 4, r = 2.0, Pm = 0.01 and using MA for the network generation.
probability w. In this appendix, we address the question about what happen with the
outcome of the model if the behavior of the focal players is affected by the abundance of
each strategy through the learning activity Li instead through the effective social influence
PO − PS. In fig. 7 we show the fraction of cooperation into the system as a function of
r for different values of a. These results have been obtained following the same procedure
that for the ones of fig. 2 but considering the learning activity instead the social influence.
As we can see, the system presents a phase transition from a non-cooperative state to a
cooperative one with a low rc for the three values of a considered. Besides, we observe that
rc increases with a. However, we have checked for a = 1 that the system is not able to
overcome the emergence of mutants for the values of r considered. In particular, in this
case, we have observed rc > 10 and c¯ evolves with strong oscillations. In this way, it is
expected an optimal a ≈ 2 where rc is minimal. However, it is important to note that the
rc required for cooperation to evolve is larger than the one required considering the social
influence. Besides, we observe that the transitions are smoother than the ones shown in the
previous section. In particular, the region where c¯ reaches intermediate values correspond
to the situation where some realizations finish with a high level of cooperation and other
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ones near zero cooperation. Besides, for r > rc we observe that c¯ presents some irregularities
where the average fraction of cooperation slightly decreases for some values of r. These are
produced by the existence of some realization where the cooperative system dies before the
104 generations considered. In this way, we conclude that the learning activity allows to
highly cooperative systems overcome the emergence of mutants defectors but with higher rc
and lower life expectancy that the ones obtained through the social influence.
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Figure 8: Comparison between learning activity and social influence. Fraction of defectors as a
function of the degree of individuals. The results have been obtained for L = 4, r = 4.0, Pm = 0.01
and using MA for the network generation. Besides, for the case with social influence we consider
β = 1.
In order to better understand why the social influence improves the required conditions
for cooperation to evolve with respect to the ones obtained with the learning activity, in
fig. 8 we show in log-log scale the fraction of defectors as a functions of the degree of the
nodes. Besides, we show the analogous results obtained by considering the social influence to
perform a clear comparison. The results have been obtained in the same way that the ones of
fig. 6. In both cases, we observe that defectors preferably inhabit the less linked individuals.
However, the fraction of defectors is higher for the case with learning activity than the
one with social influence for highly connected individuals. In this way, with the learning
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activity the system is more prone to have strong defectors and, therefore, the conditions
required for cooperation to evolve are larger than the ones required when it is considered
the social influence. Nevertheless, although we have shown that social influence have a better
performance than the learning activity for the evolution of cooperation, in this section we
have also shown the great importance of consider that the abundance of strategies affects
the behavior of individuals in highly cooperative systems. However, it would be of great
interest perform a thorough theoretical analysis looking for the optimal way to consider the
available information in order to ensure the best performance of the focal player.
28
